The ongoing massive fiscal policy stimulus triggered increasing concerns on the potential impact on interest rate levels, as economic theory predicts. Particularly, the deterioration of some EMU countries' fiscal positions has been putting at risk Eurozone' financial stability. In this paper, we estimate a Panel VAR 
Data and the empirical model
Our approach is based on a PVAR with annual data. The main advantage of the PVAR technique consists in the combination of the traditional VAR approach (flexible and capable of dealing with the endogeneity problem) with panel data analysis (which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity). While the advantage of using panels consists in an increase in the number of observations, the disadvantage is the need to impose certain homogeneity restrictions. However, by focusing on EMU countries only, we limit the potential heterogeneity, as the EMU economies share many similarities and are part of a monetary union.
The structural form of our PVAR model is given by:
where Z it is an (mx1) vector of endogenous variables; A 0 is an (mxn) matrix with 1's on the diagonal and contains the parameters that capture the contemporaneous relations among the variables; A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; finally, e it is the structural disturbance vector. Pre-multiplying (1) by
we obtain the reduced form that we can actually estimate:
where and is the reduced form residual vector. Z debt GDP ltir = , where debt it is the stock of real government debt, GDP it is real aggregate activity, ltir it is the 10-years nominal interest rate on government bonds. All variables are first differences, real, and expressed in logs. We tested the presence of a cointegrating relationship among the variables of the PVAR, and we found none. Unit root tests (available upon request) show that the series are all integrated of order one in our sample, thus we proceeded with the estimation of the PVAR in first differences (that is, with stationary variables).
Our identification scheme is based on a lower triangular Cholesky decomposition with the above indicated ordering. Hence, a variable coming earlier in the ordering affects the next ones both contemporaneously and with a lag, while a variable coming later has merely lagged effects on the preceding ones. In our model, such a identification strategy amounts to assuming that long-term nominal interest rates affect aggregate activity and the stock of public debt only with a one-period lag. These might be viewed as pretty harmless assumption, due to -respectively -lags in implementation of investment decisions and the standard formulation of government intertemporal budget constraint in macro models. Moreover, we do not allow a contemporaneous effect of GDP level on the stock of government liabilities, which again is consistent with the formulation of fiscal policy rules targeting -whenever sensitive to the business cycle -last period output gap. Instead, we allow contemporaneous effect of aggregate activity on interest rate (through monetary policy rule and the transmission along the yield curve), and of public debt on both GDP and interest rate, which is the focus of our investigation.
Our sample consists of 11 EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany,
The whole sample
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions to a one per cent increase in the real stock of public debt (details are contained in Table 4 ). 7 The panel is balanced, apart from very few missing values (Greece 1970 (Greece -1972 (Greece & 1989 (Greece -1991 Ireland 1970, interest rate; Portugal 1970 Portugal -1972 . We excluded Luxembourg due to limited availability of fiscal variables. Note that Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia also are part of the EMU, but we excluded these countries from the sample since they only became member between 2007 and 2009. 8 To perform the analysis we used the Stata pvar routine written by Inessa Love (see Love and Zicchino, 2006) .
Figure 1 about here
The long term interest rate reacts positively to debt shocks, with a peak on the second year after the shock; however, the impulse response is not statistically significant at conventional levels. As for the impact on GDP, there is a small negative effect on impact (-0.07% of GDP), but it dies out after one year. Such a result would therefore point towards the non-existence of a well defined relationship between fiscal shocks and nominal interest rates. However, there are two dimensions that are worth exploring in order to deepen the analysis: the structural break represented by the establishment of the EMU, and the heterogeneity in public debt's levels.
Particularly, the introduction of a common monetary policy with a strong and explicit mandate on inflation, coupled with the enforcement of fiscal policy constraints (the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact) might have played a crucial role in breaking the link between fiscal shocks and interest rates on the capital market, due in particular to credibility gains in the monetary policy conduct. In addition to that, the potential non-linearity in the panel related to different levels of public debt among EMU countries are worth an analysis. Table 3 reports the average debt/GDP levels of the 11 countries in our sample, both in the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods. According to that information, we label Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands as "high-debt countries", whereas the remaining ones will be referred to as "low-debt countries".
Having established these two further dimension of analysis, we proceed by estimating our PVAR first on the two different time spans (pre-EMU and post-EMU), and then on the two different sub-samples ("high-debt countries" and "low-debt countries"). Figure 2 shows the results of the PVAR model on the 1970-1996. Note that we used the year 1997 as starting date for EMU because admissions were agreed on May 3rd 1997, and national exchange rates were irrevocably fixed from that day on. However -as also mentioned in the robustness analysis in section 5 -using 1998 does not change our results qualitatively, and only very little on the quantitative side.
EMU and average fiscal position matter.
The first column reports the impulse response function for the whole sample, while the remaining tworespectively -for high-debt and low-debt countries (Tables 5-7 contains the detailed results).
Figure 2 about here
We can now observe some features that were hidden in the previous subsection's analysis. First of all, the first column of figure 2 shows that, prior to the introduction of the Euro, in the whole countries-sample a 1 per cent increase in government debt lead to a positive and significant rise in interest rates (20 basis points on impact, 17 in the first year).
Secondly, this effect is much stronger for economies featured by a relatively higher level of government debt than it is for disciplined countries. For the former group, (second column) the effect of the debt-shock is equal to a rather substantial 43 basis points increase on impact (and additional 42 in the first year); for the latter (third column), the impact is much smaller (15 basis point on impact) and not statistically significant at standard levels. Thus, the same kind of non-linearity found by Ardagna (2007) for OECD countries is confirmed here at the EMU level.
In line with similar result obtained by Bernoth (2004) and discussed in section 2, we found that the creation of the EMU stands as a structural break in the relationship between government debt and interest rates.
Before its introduction, long-term interest rates were sensitive to non-systematic increase in public debt, pointing out that the textbook channels were fully at work. Our model indicates that after the establishment of the monetary union this effect vanishes. However, results so far tell us nothing about the role of heterogeneity in debt levels per se. In other words, accounting for this kind of heterogeneity could be meaningful regardless of the introduction of the euro. To check that, we run our model on the whole time span for both high-debt and low debt countries sub-samples. First and second columns show, respectively, results for the high-debt and low-debt countries sub-samples.
They confirm the fact that the long term interest rate reacts in a more substantial way to debt shocks in high debt countries (the impact reaches a peak of 20 basis points after one year, while the peak for the low debt countries is reached after four years and amounts to 10 points only). However, none of the interest rates responses are significant at conventional levels. Thus, a difference in the pre-existing stocks of government liabilities (which can be seen as an autonomous risk indicator) does not account per se for the significance of the relationship under investigation.
We can therefore conclude that between the introduction of the EMU and the asymmetric position of high/low debt economies, the critical issue is the former; no substantial role for that differentiation, in fact, is found over the 1970-2008 period. Nonetheless, within the pre-EMU regime we can still notice a dual impact: a 1 per cent increase in government liabilities in high-debt countries caused a rise in interest rates almost three times higher than in more disciplined economies.
The interpretation that we offer of our results is the following. In the short-term -as impulse response functions in a VAR analysis necessarily are -shocks on debt display effects on government bond yields essentially through the risk premium perception. To the extent that risk is an increasing function of the existing stock of public liabilities, this explains our results on the non-linearity effects. However, the crucial feature seems to have been the establishment of the monetary union. The disappearance of exchange rate risk, the strong anti-inflation mandate to the European Central Bank, and the fiscal discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact seem to have affected the causality chain that goes from debt shocks -through risk perception -to bonds 'yields, thereby providing a sort of common "umbrella" to isolate returns on government bond from associated risk perception. Each of the three above-mentioned factors, in fact, played a role in the transmission mechanism. The possibility of competitive devaluations of national currencies (possibly triggered by excessive debt accumulation) had always been crucial in accounting for spreads in the short term (see Favero et al. 1997 ); lack of credibility and discretionary monetary policies (only partially disciplined by the exchange rate mechanism) by some national central banks did not contrast the transmission of debt shocks to interest rate term structure. Finally, the lack of explicit constraints for fiscal discipline was the primary engine to set off the transmission. Obviously those three factors -and the related gains stemming from their disappearance -were not equally spread among perspective EMU members (no doubt southern Europe countries gained from EMU umbrella more than continental economies); nonetheless, our analysis looks at the overall dimension of the monetary union, regardless of national specificities before and after admission.
Robustness tests
We checked the validity of the results reported in the previous subsections along two distinct lines of robustness test.
First we estimate our model as in equation (1) with different specifications. We used the long-term real interest rate (instead of the nominal), changed the Cholesky order and varied the end of the pre-EMU period from 1996 to 1997 (as reported earlier in the text). None of the above alternative changes produces any significant modifications in our benchmark results.
Secondly, we wanted to control for the possible relative role of one country in the sample in determining our results. Thus we re-estimated our PVAR excluding from the sample one country at a time, in order to verify whether our results depend critically on one national economy. Figure 4 here below reports the collection of impulse response functions generated by these attempts, both on the whole time span (left column) and in the pre-EMU period (right column).
Figure 4 about here
It is clear that all functions are centered on those reported in previous sections, so we can reasonably rule out the possibility that our results are driven by one particular row in our panel.
Conclusions and policy implications
The timing of the crisis is sadly straightforward, and seems to overlap pretty well with the yearly calendar.
The burst of the financial crisis (2007), followed by the transmission to the real side of the economy (2008), and then the impressive monetary and fiscal stimulus measures to contrast the heavy downturn (2009). The year 2010 will probably be dominated by the macroeconomic consequences of the recovery plans, particularly on public finances (heavily stressed all over the world) and particularly in the EMU, which is facing its first important test. Much of the attention has focused on the effects of fiscal imbalances on the debt service; empirical literature seems to have privileged non-VAR analysis on US (or at best OECD) economy. In this paper, we focused on EMU area with a Panel VAR methodology which allowed us to enjoy a substantial number of observations (39 annual observations for 11 countries) without being damaged too much by the implied homogeneity restrictions, given the degree of integration achieved by EMU economies at least on the macroeconomic side.
Our results show that a positive and significant relationship between public debt and interest rate emerges only before the introduction of the single currency with a substantial asymmetry between high and low debt countries (defined as those with a debt/GDP ratio higher/lower than the median); while a one per cent increase in the stock of government liabilities causes a 43 basis point increase on 10-year government bond's yields for high-debt economies, the impact is much smaller (and less significant) for more disciplined countries. Our results also show that as the non-linearity in the effects is significant only in the pre-EMU period, the crucial feature in breaking the transmission of credit risk to interest rate seems to have been the establishment of the monetary union.
This result offers at least two alternative interpretations: if, on one hand, it seems to confirm the crucial role of the single currency in providing a "macroeconomic shield" (or Euro-dividend) for less disciplined economies, on the other it suggest a possible moral hazard problem. The existence of such a safety net, in fact, might disincentive the pursue of balanced national fiscal positions; until the Stability and Growth Pact was fully effective, the moral hazard had somehow been disciplined, although maybe imperfectly. When the burst of the crisis made the SGP-constraint less binding, the problem emerged in all its severity, starting from peripheral EMU countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. On the top of that, the increasing use of Credit Default Swap contracts (CDS) as risk management tool on financial assets -and specifically government bonds -is creating a new transmission channel of country risk. High-frequency data such as those available on CDS can hardly be inserted in a traditional VAR analysis like the one contained in this paper; nevertheless, incorporating the information conveyed by the price of those assets into empirical macroeconomic analysis is a promising suggestion for future work in this area.
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